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Evaluation of Evidence: Pre-Modern and Modern Approaches, by Mirjan 
Damaška, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019, viii + 152 pp. (including 
index), £80 (hardback), ISBN 978-1108497282 
 
One of the major debates among evidence scholars is the extent to which there 
should be controls on the free evaluation of evidence, particularly in criminal 
cases. Should the trier of fact (the jury in a serious criminal case in England and 
Wales) have access to as much evidence as possible, or should there be barriers 
that regulate what evidence can be taken into account in reaching a decision? At 
least as it is traditionally conceived, the ‘law of evidence’ in Anglo-American legal 
systems is concerned to a large degree with principles concerning the admissibility 
of evidence, these principles being the tools relied on to perform such a regulatory 
function. The contemporary trend in England and Wales, it may be argued, has 
been towards facilitating the freer evaluation of evidence. For example, the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 ushered in changes to the law which resulted in hearsay 
evidence becoming somewhat more readily admissible, and, arguably, evidence of 
the bad character of defendants becoming much more readily admissible. While 
such a trend has its advocates (see e.g. Lord Justice Auld, Review of the Criminal 
Courts of England and Wales, London, 2001), some have urged caution about it 
(see e.g. F. Schauer, ‘In Defense of Rule-Based Evidence Law—and Epistemology 
Too’ (2008) 5 Episteme 295; A Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law, Oxford, 2005). 
Mirjan R. Damaška has a formidable reputation as a comparative legal 
scholar with a particular interest in issues of evidence and procedure. His previous 
monographs—The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach 
to the Legal Process, New Haven, 1986, and Evidence Law Adrift, New Haven, 
1997—were both considered ground-breaking in their time and have continued to 
exert an influence on the shape of academic debates and on academic thinking 
generally. Damaška’s third monograph, Evaluation of Evidence: Pre-Modern and 
Modern Approaches, the book under review, has therefore been eagerly 
anticipated. 
Damaška’s central mission in Evaluation of Evidence is to subject to close 
scrutiny the notion, which he perceives as having become generally accepted, that 
Roman-Canon law, with its technical rules, largely precluded free evaluation of 
evidence, and that it was only later that such evaluation became a feature of the 
law in Continental Europe. This is described by Damaška as ‘the widespread belief 
that the value of evidence in the Roman-canon fact-finding scheme was 
established by applying legal proof rules mechanically, so that the judge acted as 
an automaton or an accountant of prescribed items of evidence. A well-known 
nineteenth-century French historian likened the judge to a harpsichord 
responding to keys that are struck’ (p. 49). Exposing such an interpretation of 
history as insufficiently nuanced (‘the epistemic views of the founders of the 
Roman-canon fact-finding scheme were not as distant from our [contemporary] 
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views as standard accounts suggest’ (p. 46)) is the theme of this relatively short 
book, which consists of a prologue, eleven (often brief) chapters and an epilogue. 
What follows here is a selective look at the illustrations with which Damaška 
defends his thesis. 
In Chapter 4 Damaška considers the ‘two eyewitnesses’ rule in the Roman-
canon system, under which, according to the conventional wisdom, ‘the judge was 
bound to impose blood punishment on the sworn testimony of two legally 
competent eyewitnesses even if he was unpersuaded by their assertions’ (p. 59). In 
reality, however, Damaška finds (p. 63) that ‘the testimony of legally competent 
witnesses was not credited unreflectively’, and that 
the judge was required to watch carefully for signs of possible falsity in the 
assertions of witnesses. If he detected contradictions in a testimonial 
account, its accuracy came under a cloud and was unlikely to be credited. If 
a witness was caught lying on one point, his entire testimony could be 
rejected. But the judge was required not only to scrutinize the content of 
what witnesses asserted, but also to observe their demeanor for possible 
signs of falsity. He was expected to note, for example, if the witness blushed, 
stuttered, hesitated in answering questions, or in some other way produced 
signs of possible falsity. 
Chapter 5 examines the rule in the Roman-canon system pursuant to which 
in-court confessions constituted full proof. The reality, however, according to 
Damaška, was that such confessions were not invariably accepted; in particular, 
judges had the power to reject coerced confessions which they found unreliable. 
What was required was that ‘indubitable indications’ of guilt—that is, evidence 
leading the judge to believe that the defendant was guilty—be compiled. If the 
defendant then confessed under torture, the judge’s belief in guilt would effectively 
be confirmed. 
Oral hearsay evidence is one of the issues considered in Chapter 7. While 
exceptions to the hearsay prohibition were readily available in the Roman-canon 
system, Damaška points out (p. 103) that, in reality, 
[t]he judge could use hearsay witnesses only if he was unable to reach the 
out-of-court declarant. And if a hearsay witness was unable to identify the 
declarant, his testimony was inadmissible. It is also important that the 
declarant was supposed to be a person of substance (persona gravis), and 
the credibility of the hearsay witness had to be ‘above all exception’. 
Conversely, hearsay evidence that was not covered by an exception could still, if 
credible, influence a court’s decision, as ‘judges could use knowledge acquired from 
forbidden hearsay in formulating questions to be addressed to legally competent 
witnesses, and evaluate their responses in light of this knowledge. And if forbidden 
hearsay made them doubt the testimony of these witnesses, especially those 
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relating incriminating information, judges would find them not to be “above all 
exception”’ (p. 104). 
Chapter 8 considers two devices which Damaška interprets as having been 
utilised to circumvent the effect of the stringent Roman-canon full proof standard. 
The first was extraordinary punishment (poena extraordinaria), taking the form 
of banishment, fines and corporal punishments, and available at the discretion of 
the judge when compelling incriminating evidence falling short of full proof was 
gathered against defendants accused of serious crimes (p. 106). The second was an 
intermediate judgment (absolutio ab instantia), lying in between an acquittal and 
a conviction and leaving the issue of criminal responsibility technically 
undetermined, but justifying placing the defendant under surveillance and also 
placing various restrictions on his activities (p. 111). Damaška draws attention to 
the contemporary Scottish ‘not proven’ verdict as an example of a form of 
intermediate judgment (p. 112 fn 21). 
As a scholar of the contemporary law of evidence in common law 
jurisdictions generally and England and Wales in particular, with limited 
expertise in either legal history or Continental legal systems, I found Evaluation 
of Evidence informative and thought-provoking. It illustrates how closer 
examination may well reveal greater convergence between ‘pre-modern’ and 
‘modern’ approaches to an issue than the conventional wisdom might have it. As 
Damaška vividly explains: ‘In the end, both schemes produced fact-finding 
arrangements in which the evaluation of evidence is neither entirely bound by 
rules nor entirely free from them. The expectation to find a radical difference 
between the two fact-finding schemes in terms of the judge’s degree of freedom in 
attributing value to evidence evaporates on closer inspection like mist on summer 
mornings’ (p. 127). It is noted too that, ‘[o]n a continuum from an ideal type of 
factual inquiry governed by legal rules to an ideal of factual inquiry without them, 
both premodern and modern fact-finding arrangements arrived at positions not 
far from the middle’ (p. 138). 
More broadly, the book illustrates the triumph of deft judicial manoeuvring 
over the application of ‘technical’ rules where such application might yield a result 
considered unpalatable. Yet, as Damaška cautions, this does not suggest that rules 
of evidence should be abolished; rather, the conclusion it may point to ‘is that if 
useful legal rules on the processing of evidence can be drafted, they should not be 
treated as a departure from but rather as movements toward an ideal’ (p. 147). 
Damaška’s expression throughout the book is clear and elegant, even if at 
times a little florid. I do wonder whether the material might have been presented 
in a slightly more economical fashion; in particular, there is probably scope for the 
presentation of the discussions in the prologue and first three chapters, which set 
the scene for the more focused discussions in the rest of the book, to be tightened. 
Chapter 9, entitled ‘Recapitulation’, serves as a bridge to the final two chapters, 
which concern the contemporary position in Continental and common law systems, 
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but it is unclear whether the first half or so of this five-page chapter serves much 
useful purpose. The book is well produced and pleasing to the eye. The absence of 
a bibliography, however, is somewhat disappointing, given that it would be useful 
to have all the sources relied on by the author gathered in one place. 
In sum, Evaluation of Evidence is a worthy successor to Damaška’s earlier 
monographs, and a fine product of the several decades’ gestation that Damaška 
alludes to in his Acknowledgements (p. viii). It will no doubt set the benchmark 
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